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Introduction 
 
With recent technological advances in intelligent transportation systems (ITS), Vehicular 
Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) have seen expanded applications. VANETs are systems of 
vehicles communicating with each other and roadside infrastructures. One application for 
VANETs is Vehicle Safety Communication (VSC), which aim to enhance vehicle safety and 
the driving experience. VSC can be further broken down into vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) 
communications and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications. An example of V2V 
communication is platooning, where vehicles closely follow other vehicles aided by 
wirelessly exchanging steering and acceleration information. Examples of V2I 
communication are automatic tollbooth payments, where vehicles can automatically send 
their occupants' payment information to tollbooths without having to stop, and emergency 
roadside warnings, where roadside infrastructures can broadcast to vehicles information 
about upcoming dangerous weather and road conditions [1]. Because VANETs use wireless 
technology for communication, attackers can easily pick up signal packets with proper 
equipment [2, 3]. This brings into question whether a malicious at-tacker can track users for 
an extended period of time using these messages, in what we refer to as a tracking attack.  
One means of mitigating a tracking attack is using pseudonyms in VANET messages [4]. 
Pseudonyms are temporary unique identifiers used by vehicles when sending VSC messages 
that are switched regularly to prevent tracking over long periods of time. Pseudonyms are 
distributed to vehicles by a trusted third-party Certificate Authority (CA), with vehicles' 
owners being associated with their vehicles' pseudonyms, for liability reasons [5]. Requiring 
a CA instead of simply allowing vehicles to generate their own pseudonyms ensures 
authenticity, prevents pseudonym spoofing, and mitigates pseudonym collisions. While a 
simple strategy for protecting user privacy in VANETS is to frequently switch pseudonyms, 
this is not an ideal solution because pseudonym changes are expensive [6]. The cost for 
changing pseudonyms comes from the limited number of pseudonyms a vehicle can store and 
the expense, or impossibility, of downloading new pseudonyms. To most effectively change 
pseudonyms, research has been done into pseudonym change strategies, or algorithms that 
determine when to best change pseudonyms. While pseudonym change strategies aim to 
maximize the utility of each pseudonym change, they do not guarantee preserving user 
privacy.  
Previous research has investigated the possibility and effectiveness of tracking wireless 
devices and vehicles using the beacon messages transmitted periodically by the tracking 
targets. Recent works showed that an attacker can track many mobile devices with accuracy 
comparable to GPS and pro-vide high-accuracy trajectory information by simply using 
inexpensive o - the-shelf equipment [2, 3]. Furthermore, it has been suggested that vehicles' 
tire pressure monitoring systems (TPMS) contain vulnerabilities that would allow an attacker 
to perform such tracking attacks [7]. This project is a survey of historical privacy security 
attacks and defenses in VANETs. I begin with a discussion of recent pseudonym change 
strategies, then explore privacy attacks that have been proposed in previous research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pseudonym Change Strategies 
 
Because of the concern of vehicle tracking through the use of V2X protocols, there 
have been a number of works exploring effective means of defending against such attacks. A 
key means of defending against vehicle tracking is the use of pseudonyms [8]. A pseudonym 
is a unique identifier associated with a signal emitted by a vehicle to allow unique 
identification for a period of time, as some signal usages require identification, but also 
changed periodically to prevent long-term tracking. The simple strategy for protecting 
privacy in VANETs by frequently changing pseudonym is not ideal because pseudonym 
changes are expensive due to limited pseudonym storage capacities, limited download 
capabilities for new pseudonyms, and increased costs on various applications [8, 5]. 
Therefore, effective pseudonym change strategies, algorithms that dictate when a vehicle 
changes pseudonyms, have been developed to maximize the effectiveness of each pseudonym 
change, while minimizing the number of changes required. 
A common strategy is a periodic change strategy [4], in which the signal protocols dictate 
how often a vehicle broadcasts a message (heart-rate) and changes its pseudonym (change-
rate), with all vehicles having the same heart-rate and change-rate if they are using the same 
protocol. In a periodic change strategy, vehicles change their pseudonyms every N seconds, 
using a simple counter to determine when the time limit has been reached. This change 
strategy is simple and does not require cooperation among neigh-boring vehicles to 
coordinate pseudonym changes, which prevents malicious adversaries to disrupt privacy 
gains of pseudonym changes by vehicles within the VANET, a topic which has been 
investigated in graduate student Nicholas Plewtong's thesis paper [9].  
Another common strategy is a random change strategy [4], where a random number is 
generated before each beacon broadcast. If the generated number is below a predetermined 
threshold, then the vehicle changes pseudonyms. Similar to the periodic change strategy, the 
random change strategy is a simple strategy and does not require inter-vehicle cooperation to 
effectively change pseudonyms.  
Another pseudonym change strategy is a synchronous change strategy [4]. The 
synchronous change strategy can be classified as a type of a position change strategy, where 
vehicles change pseudonyms when a minimum thresh-old of vehicle density within their 
proximity is met. The synchronous change strategy requires coordination among the vehicles 
in the VANET to maximize effectiveness of pseudonym changes. Vehicles that change 
pseudonyms together would prove to be more di cult for an attacker to associate their new 
pseudonyms to their respective old pseudonyms due to the lack of distinguishing features and 
increased number of possible association pairs. The synchronous change strategy has vehicles 
ready to change pseudonyms cmin seconds after their last change. Vehicles indicate their 
readiness to change by setting a change ag within their broadcast messages. A change is 
triggered when there are k - 1 other vehicles with their change ag set within the transmission 
range. This allows for a synchronous pseudonym change by all vehicles ready to change 
pseudonyms within that given area. If the threshold of k - 1 vehicles is not met within cmax 
seconds after the last change, then the vehicle changes pseudonyms anyways. This is to 
prevent vehicles from perpetually waiting for the number of vehicles threshold to be met in 
sparse areas or in areas where this strategy has not been adopted [4]. On its own without the 
necessary modifications, the synchronous change strategy would be susceptible to malicious 
adversaries posing as compliant vehicles nodes that aim to disrupt the vehicular privacy of 
nodes within the VANET [9]. A similar change strategy called the density-based location 
privacy scheme has also been proposed that uses the same concept of changing pseudonyms 
when enough other vehicles are within proximity to make old-new pseudonym associations 
more di cult [10]. 
 
Another type of position change algorithm is a similar status algorithm. In a similar status 
algorithm, vehicles coordinate pseudonym changes by looking for other vehicles with a 
similar status as their own, with a pseudonym change occurring when a given number of 
vehicles with a similar status are within proximity of a respective vehicle. This strategy 
allows for many different things to be considered features of a vehicle's status such as speed, 
direction, and number of neighbors [11]. However, this strategy requires the broadcasting of 
additional descriptive information about the vehicle, which can be used by adversaries to 
further distinguish vehicles from each other [12].  
AMOEBA is another means of defending user privacy that takes advantage of the 
clustering nature VANETs to prevent malicious attackers [13]. While not a pseudonym 
change strategy, AMOEBA is a privacy scheme that employs the use of pseudonyms, namely 
a single group pseudonym representative of all vehicles within a given cluster. Groups are 
formed by vehicles that move with a similar velocity and relative to each other, and have a 
fully connected network graph within them to allow for communication among their 
respective members. A leader of the group is elected at random and broadcasts on behalf of 
the group members, while other members can remain silent. AMOEBA also defines the use 
of silent periods to prevent linkability between two locatable broadcasts. Random silent 
periods are used to prevent trackability. An example would be if a vehicle changes its 
pseudonym from A to A'. Initially entering a network and broadcasting as A, after having 
changed and waited a random silent period, it begins broadcasting as A'. If another vehicle 
had changed pseudonyms from B to B' within that silent period, an attacker may be misled to 
tracking the neighboring vehicle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Privacy Attacks 
 
A common attack used to quantitatively compare pseudonym and tracking related 
defenses is trying to match enter events with their respective exit events [14, 15]. Enter and 
exit events represent when a vehicle enters or exits a mix zone, respectively. A mix zone is an 
area outside of an attacker's area of observation, where vehicles can become mixed together 
without an attacker's knowledge.  
The premise of this attack is to match corresponding enter and exit events using 
previously learned data. The attack is broken into two phases, a learn-ing phase and an attack 
phase. During the learning phase, the attacker records the number of vehicles that travel 
between two areas of observation and the average time each vehicle took to make that 
respective trip. The data learned is limited to what can be learned from observing 
pseudonyms for the pseudonym’s given lifespan, that is, the time before the vehicle changes 
pseudonyms. This means that due to vehicles changing pseudonyms, the number of vehicles 
recorded to have traveled between two locations can be greater than the actual number of 
vehicles. During the attack phase, the attack rst actively attempts an online attack to match 
each newly observed exit event to a previously observed enter event. This step simply 
matches events if they broadcast the same pseudonyms and removes the events from the set 
of events that are used later. After, all unmatched events are used to create a bipartite graph, 
with the two distinct sets being exit and enter events. Edges are assigned between an exit and 
an enter event with a weight equal to the number of vehicles that traveled between the two 
points where the events were observed divided by the average time each vehicle took., with a 
penalty added the farther the actual trip time was from the average trip time. If during the 
learning phase, no trip was recorded between the two locations, then a small weight of 0.1 is 
given. When the bipartite graph is complete, the solution is a matter of solving the linear sum 
problem and getting a minimal cost perfect match of the graph. The success of the attack is 
measured by how many pairs of events were correctly matched. 
Attacks have also been developed that take advantage of specific message protocol 
features. In Examining Privacy in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks, the authors break down the 
privacy vulnerabilities of the DSRC protocol stack [12]. Within SAE J2735, the standard 
message structure for DSRC messages, a vehicle is identified by a 4-byte temporary identifier 
pseudonym, while also broadcasting information such as the vehicle's GPS coordinates, 
motion information, and vehicle size that can be seen by anyone. The authors argue that 
DSRC messages leak enough information that an attacker can circumvent the temporary 
nature of the pseudonym and track vehicles despite switching pseudonyms, as well as linking 
pseudonyms to the actual vehicle or owner. The authors claim that attackers can use 
statistical methods, similar to my attack, to track vehicles regardless of pseudonym switches. 
The main means of doing so is when a vehicle switches pseudonyms, an attacker will see a 
pseudonym no longer transmitting, and a new pseudonym begins transmit-ting within close 
proximity. The effectiveness of this attack increases with greater coverage and can also take 
advantage of the descriptive information contained in DSRC messages to better associate 
pseudonyms in the case of multiple vehicles simultaneously switching pseudonyms. I use a 
similar method in one of my matrix constructions, but I am limited to the pseudonym 
information of a new pseudonym appearing shortly after an old pseudonym disappears. The 
authors then claim that by using this location information, attackers can link pseudonyms 
back to the vehicle owners. Aside from the direct linkage of pseudonyms to their owners by 
gaining access to the pseudonym database, an attacker can use the location information to 
build a pro le for certain vehicles. Knowing where vehicles stop and go at what times, an 
attacker can correlate points of interest to buildings and times visited to possibly discover 
where the user works and lives. After narrowing down buildings, an attacker can further 
pinpoint the user by performing a lookup of owners and occupants of the buildings for 
residency and employee directories for businesses in that area. 
 
The authors describe a more general version of the previously mentioned synchronous 
pseudonym strategy [4] as an effective pseudonym change strategy to prevent tracking, 
although the use of a similar status algorithm[11] would likely be even more effective, as 
DSRC messages already contain descriptive information about a vehicle. They also cite the 
use of a group pseudonym as a means of defending privacy [13], though they do note that an 
attacker can attack the point when a vehicle leaves a cluster and enters a new one to learn 
information.  
An attack developed by the authors of [16] aims to associate a large set of collected 
anonymous location samples to anonymous location pro les using the established Multiple 
Hypothesis Tracking (MHT) algorithm to track vehicles' locations over an extended period of 
time. MHT addresses the data association problem by generating a set of data associations 
hypotheses every time a new set of measurements arrives, with each hypothesis being a 
possible association of a measurement with a target. The probability for each hypothesis to be 
correct is calculated and the highest probability is chosen to be the solution. MHT relies on 
Kalman filters [17] to estimate the state variables of each target: position and velocity. This 
attack assumes the role of a passive attacker with perfect eavesdropping capabilities, where 
an at-tacker receives all beacon messages sent over the network. They assume that vehicles 
broadcast their location and velocity at regular intervals, but with pseudonyms that change for 
every packet to completely anonymize the transmissions. Their experiments showed that at 
high beaconing rates of a beacon a second or faster and less than 100 vehicles, they were able 
to track vehicles for on average 800 out of the 1000 seconds in their simulations. Increasing 
the vehicle density to be between 100 and 250 vehicles saw the average tracking time drop to 
700 seconds. A beaconing rate of a beacon every two seconds sees an average of less than 
400 seconds of tracking when there are even 50 vehicles, and a drop to 150 seconds when 
there are 100 vehicles. Beaconing rates slower than a beacon every two seconds only saw 
tracking of 100 seconds when there were less than 25 vehicles in the system, and there was 
no substantial tracking after 50 vehicles. Their attack is also dependent on accurate position 
information. When they introduce random noise into the gathered position information, a 
random o set anywhere between one to five meters decreased tracking by 200 down to 700 
seconds. They also explore the effectiveness of their tracking with varying equipment rates. 
They actually see an increase in average tracking time, up to nearly 900 seconds when the 
equipment rate is 10 or 20%. This is due the much smaller number of vehicles being tracked, 
as they can only track equipped vehicles, and lower equipment rates mean the likelihood of 
equipped vehicles crossing paths is less likely. 
 
 
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, expanded applications in VANETs have brought into question 
vehicular privacy concerns. The use of pseudonyms is the key means of defending user 
privacy when broadcasting messages. Pseudonym change strategies are algorithms used to 
determine when vehicles should change pseudonyms, and research into different change 
strategies have aimed to maximize the privacy gains while minimizing the number of 
pseudonym changes. Research has also been done into different potential attacks that an 
attacker can use to undermine vehicular privacy. Researching both defenses and at-tacks are 
important to defending vehicular privacy. The development of new attacks can be used to test 
the effectiveness of defenses against such attacks. 
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